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The	   European	   Union	   and	   the	   Member	   States:	  
Organised	  Hypocrisy?	  	  	  	  Thomas	  Christiansen*	  	  	  	  Dear	   Rein,	   dear	   Professors,	   dear	   colleagues,	   dear	   family	   and	   friends:	   thank	   you	   for	  attending	   my	   inauguration	   today.	   It	   is	   my	   pleasure	   and	   my	   privilege	   to	   have	   this	  opportunity	  to	  present	  to	  you	  some	  ideas	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  European	  integration,	  and	  in	  particular	  about	  the	  contribution	  I	  hope	  to	  make	  to	  the	  field	  of	  European	  Studies	  in	  my	  new	  position.	  	  
Introduction	  Accepting	  a	  Chair	  in	  European	  Institutional	  Politics	  at	  Maastricht	  University	  is	  a	  special	  honour,	   not	   only	   because	   Maastricht	   University	   is	   a	   young,	   dynamic	   and	   successful	  university	  with	  global	   ambitions,	   or	  because	  our	   faculty	   is	  home	   to	  one	  of	   the	   largest	  and	   fastest-­‐growing	   European	   Studies	   programmes.	   It	   is	   special	   also	   because	   it	   was	  here	  in	  Maastricht	  that	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  was	  negotiated	  and	   signed	   –	   an	   event	   that	   arguably	   constituted	   the	   most	   important	   reform	   in	   the	  history	  of	  European	  integration.	  What	  we	  call	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  was	  actually	  a	  revision	  of	  the	  Community’s	  original	  founding	   treaties	   –	   the	  Rome	  Treaties	   –	   and	   it	   introduced	  momentous	   innovations	   to	  the	  EU	  (Laursen	  &	  Vanhoonacker,	  1994).	  One	  only	  needs	  to	  mention	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  –	  considered	  by	  many	  at	  the	  time	  to	  be	  an	  impossible	  project	  (Dyson	  &	  Featherstone,	  1999)	  –	  in	  order	  to	  illustrate	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty.	  Or	  think	   of	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	   co-­‐decision	   procedure	   which	   gave	   equality	   to	   the	  European	  Parliament	   and	  Council	   of	  Ministers	   in	   the	  making	   of	   EU	   laws	   –	   something	  that	   when	   proposed	   by	   the	   Parliament	   a	   decade	   earlier	   was	   rejected	   by	   most	  governments	   (Pinder,	   2007).	   Each	   of	   these	   changes	   in	   itself	   can	   be	   considered	  revolutionary,	   not	   just	   in	   the	   context	   of	   European	   integration	   but	   also	   in	   terms	   of	  international	   politics	  more	   generally.	   Here	   in	  Maastricht,	   the	   integration	   process	   not	  only	  came	  of	  age	  –	  it	  underwent	  a	  fundamental	  transformation.	  	  
The	  Legacy	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty	  One	  might	  think	  that	  what	  happened	  here	  in	  1991	  is	  old	  news	  or	  history,	  but	  at	  second	  sight	   it	   becomes	   evident	   that	   those	   decisions	   have	   had	   a	   lasting	   effect,	   still	   shaping	  European	   politics	   on	   a	   daily	   basis.	   Just	   take	   the	   Euro	   and	   consider	   the	   events	   of	   the	  current	   year,	   with	   debt	   crises	   in	   Greece	   and	   other	   member	   states	   ultimately	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
*	  Lecture	  delivered	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  my	  inauguration	  as	  Professor	  of	  European	  Institutional	  Politics	  at	  the	  Maastricht	   University,	   17	   September	   2010.	   I	   am	   grateful	   for	   the	   valuable	   comments	   received	   on	   a	  draft	  version	  of	  this	  text	  from	  Youngah	  Guahk,	  Maarten	  Vink	  and	  Sophie	  Vanhoonacker,	  and	  for	  research	  assistance	  from	  Katharina	  Dietz.	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destabilising	   the	  monetary	  position	  of	   the	  entire	  Eurozone	  (Euractiv,	  2010).	  Coming	  a	  decade	   after	   the	   successful	   introduction	   of	   the	   new	   currency,	   and	   following	   a	   long	  period	   of	   monetary	   stability,	   the	   events	   of	   the	   past	   year	   demonstrated	   that	   crucial	  elements	   of	   the	   Union’s	   framework	  were	  missing	   –	   that	   the	   Union	  was	   not	   ready	   to	  withstand	   the	   pressures	   it	   would	   face	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis.	   It	  turned	  out	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  centralising	  monetary	  policy-­‐making	  at	  the	  European	  level	  –	  through	   the	   creation	   of	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank	   –	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   leaving	  decisions	  about	  fiscal	  policy	  with	  the	  member	  states	  was	  flawed	  (Dyson	  &	  Featherstone,	  1999,	  p.129-­‐130,	  p.222).	  	  Cynics	  –	  and	  that	  is	  what	  political	  scientists	  tend	  to	  be	  –	  might	  add	  that	  we	  should	  not	  be	   surprised	   to	   see	   national	   governments,	   having	   passed	   on	   the	   responsibility	   for	  monetary	  stability	   to	  a	   faraway	  body	  of	  European	  central	  bankers	   in	  Frankfurt,	  might	  feel	  even	  more	  inclined	  to	  run	  up	  public	  deficits	  by	  spending	  money	  they	  actually	  don’t	  have.	  (Let	  me	  add,	  in	  brackets,	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  governments	  were	  found	  to	  have	  lied	   to	   the	   EU	   about	   the	   size	   of	   their	   budget	   deficits	   (European	   Commission,	   2010a),	  should	  not	  have	  come	  as	  a	  surprise	  either.	   Instead,	  we	  may	  regard	  that	  as	   the	  natural	  outcome	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  leave	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  collection	  of	  statistical	  data	  to	  national	  governments,	  with	  the	  predictable	  result	  that	  in	  certain	  member	  states	  figures	  were	  manipulated	   in	  order	  to	  escape	  criticism	  from	  Europe.	  Things	  only	  came	  to	   light	  when	   the	   damage	   had	   already	   been	   done,	   and	   the	   consequences	   were	   impossible	   to	  hide).	   Clearly,	   the	   system	   set	   up	   in	   Maastricht	   to	   underpin	   the	   single	   currency	   was	  missing	  some	  important	  safeguards.	  	  Yet,	   it	   had	   been	  national	  governments	   that	   had	   negotiated	   and	   signed	   the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  and	  national	  parliaments	  that	  had	  ratified	  it	  (Moravcsik,	  1998,	  p.379-­‐471;	  Dyson	  &	   Featherstone,	   1999,	   p.770).	   They	   did	   realise	   that	   perhaps	   some	   safeguards	   were	  needed	  (in	  other	  words,	  that	  states	  might	  not	  be	  able	  to	  trust	  each	  other	  to	  keep	  their	  commitments).	   That	   is	   why	   the	   treaty	   contained	   the	   so-­‐called	   convergence	   criteria	   –	  minimum	   levels	   of	   economic	   and	   fiscal	   performance	   that	   countries	   had	   to	   achieve	   in	  order	  to	  be	  admitted	  into	  the	  Eurozone	  (Dyson	  &	  Featherstone,	  1999,	  p.430-­‐432).	  And,	  yes,	  member	  states	  did	  make	  efforts	  to	  bring	  their	  houses	  in	  order	  in	  the	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  single	  currency	  (Angeloni	  and	  Dedola,	  1999).	  Only	  after	  the	  honeymoon	  of	  the	  successful	  introduction	  of	  the	  euro	  was	  over,	  the	  realisation	  dawned	  on	  them	  that	  it	   might	   be	   insufficient	   to	   rely	   only	   on	   hope	   and	   good	   will	   in	   trying	   to	   ensure	   a	  continuation	   of	   sound	   economic	   and	   fiscal	   policy	   (Waigel,	   1995).	   The	   fear	   –	  metaphorically	  speaking	  -­‐	  was	  that	  the	  new	  members	  of	  the	  exclusive	  euro-­‐club,	  having	  dressed	  up	  really	  well	  in	  order	  to	  get	  in,	  might	  then	  shed	  their	  clothes	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  passed	  through	  the	  door.	  Once	   this	   particular	   loophole	   in	   the	   treaty	   arrangement	   had	   been	   identified,	  member	  states	  went	   back	   to	   the	   negotiating	   table	   and	   set	   up	   a	   “Growth	   and	   Stability	   Pact”	   in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  original	  convergence	  criteria	  would	  continue	  to	  be	  applied	  as	  stability	  criteria	  (Cini,	  2007,	  p.329).	  Good	  idea,	  but	  again	  only	  a	  half-­‐baked	  solution	  to	  the	  problem	  of	  unreliable	  compliance	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  It	  didn’t	  take	  long	  for	  some	  member	  states	  to	  trespass	  on	  these	  criteria,	  and	  then	  for	  the	  European	  Commission	  to	  be	  brushed	  aside	  when	  trying	  to	  enforce	  the	  rules	  (Case	  C-­‐27/04).	  Ironically,	  it	  was	  the	  same	  member	   state	   -­‐	  Germany	   -­‐	   that	  had	   first	  pushed	   for	   the	   stability	  pact,	   that	   then	  broke	   these	   same	   rules	   a	   few	   years	   later,	   then	   insisted	   that	   it	   wasn’t	   the	   role	   of	   the	  Commission	  to	  sanction	  such	  non-­‐compliance,	  and	  that	  during	  the	  recent	  crisis	  has	  been	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most	   critical	   (Spielel	   Online,	   2010)	   when	   in	   other	   member	   states	   things	   went	   badly	  wrong.	  	  
States	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  Patterns	  of	  Hypocrisy	  I	   hope	   you	   follow	   me	   in	   detecting	   a	   pattern	   here:	   first,	   since	   the	   1970s	   statesmen	  declared	   the	   aim	   of	   creating	   a	   single	   currency	   in	   Europe,	   but	   actually	   made	   little	  progress	  towards	  achieving	  that	  aim	  (Werner	  Report,	  1970).	  Later,	  in	  the	  1990s,	  when	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  single	  currency	  was	   finally	  agreed	  –	  and	  celebrated	  –	  member	  states	  were	  unwilling	  to	  accept	  the	  new	  constraints	  that	  came	  –	  or	  should	  have	  come	  –	  with	  such	  a	  change.	  And	  subsequently,	  once	  the	  need	  for	  a	  set	  of	  binding	  rules	  had	  become	  evident,	   they	   refused	   to	   hand	   over	   the	   necessary	   powers	   of	   enforcement	   to	   the	  supranational	  institutions	  of	  the	  EU,	  insisting	  instead	  that	  the	  states,	  coming	  together	  in	  the	  Council,	  would	  supervise	  themselves.	  Only	  now,	  a	  major	  crisis	  and	  a	  bail-­‐out	  worth	  more	   than	   €500	   billion	   later	   (Council	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   2010),	   is	   it	   becoming	  accepted	   that	   the	   Commission	   does	   in	   fact	   need	   to	   have	   stronger	   powers	   to	   oversee	  national	  fiscal	  policies	  if	  we	  are	  to	  prevent	  future	  accidents.	  Last	  June	  it	  was	  eventually	  decided	   that	   in	   the	   future	   national	   budgets	   will	   have	   to	   be	   submitted	   to	   the	   EU	   in	  advance	  for	  prior	  assessment,	  and	  that	  in	  this	  way	  the	  stability	  criteria	  will	  be	  enforced	  more	  stringently	  (European	  Council,	  2010).	  	  The	   pattern	   that	   I	   am	   alluding	   to	   here	   is	   one	   hypocrisy:	   of	   governments	  making	   far-­‐reaching	   commitments	   that	   they	   are	   not	  willing	   or	   able	   to	   keep,	   of	   politicians	   giving	  speeches	   declaring	   their	   allegiance	   to	   the	   European	   idea	   but	   pursuing	   behind	   closed	  doors	   parochial	   national	   interests;	   of	   member	   states	   working	   together	   –	   but	   often	  working	  together	  only	   in	  order	  to	  defeat	  the	  ambitions	  of	   the	  supranational	  European	  institutions	  -­‐	  Commission,	  Parliament	  and	  Court	  -­‐	   that	  have	  been	  set	  up	  to	  pursue	  the	  common	  interest.	  Now	   one	   might	   respond:	   so	   what?	   It	   is	   only	   human	   and	   natural	   that	   some	   will	  sometimes	  try	  to	  lie	  and	  cheat.	  In	  politicians	  we	  have	  in	  fact	  come	  to	  expect	  that	  sort	  of	  thing.	  And	  the	  infamous	  ‘blame	  game’	  that	  national	  leaders	  often	  play	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  EU	  –	  accepting	  for	  themselves	  the	  praise	  for	  the	  achievements	  of	  the	  Union	  while	  shifting	  the	  blame	   to	   ‘Brussels’	   for	   failures	   or	   for	   having	   to	   take	   unwelcome	   decisions	   –	   is	   well-­‐known	  and	  understood	  by	  all	  who	  study	  EU	  politics	  (Graziano	  &	  Vink,	  2007,	  p.15).	  But	  the	  kind	  of	  hypocrisy	  that	  we	  just	  discussed	  in	  the	  case	  of	  decision-­‐making	  around	  the	  euro	  goes	  beyond	  that.	  It	  is	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  states	  routinely	  interact	  with	  the	  European	  institutions.	  And,	  by	  the	  way,	  states	  are	  not	  human	  (even	  though	  I	  realise	  I	  also	  talk	  of	  them	  here	  as	  if	  they	   were	   unitary	   actors).	   States	   are	   political	   organisations,	   indeed	   the	   state	   is	   the	  political	   organisation	   of	   our	   age.	   This	   pattern	   of	   hypocrisy	   in	   the	  way	  member	   states	  relate	   to	   the	   EU	   is	   organised,	   systematic	   and	   in	   many	   ways	   built	   into	   the	   very	  functioning	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   –	   I	   will	   come	   back	   to	   that	   argument	   with	   some	  insights	  from	  my	  own	  field	  of	  study	  in	  a	  moment.	  	  	  
The	  Concept	  of	  Organised	  Hypocrisy	  But	  let	  me	  first	  of	  all	  say	  a	  few	  words	  about	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘organised	  hypocrisy’	  which	  I	  am	  using	  here	  because	  I	  think	  it	  makes	  for	  a	  suitable,	  if	  provocative,	  description	  of	  some	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aspects	   of	   EU	   politics.	   The	   term	   was	   introduced	   by	   Stephen	   Krasner,	   Professor	   of	  International	   Relations	   at	   Stanford	   University,	   who	   published	   his	   book	   Sovereignty:	  	  
Organised	   Hypocrisy	   in	   1999	   (Krasner,	   1999).	   His	   subject	   was	   not	   Europe,	   but	   the	  international	  system	  at	  large,	  and	  in	  his	  analysis	  he	  sought	  to	  show	  how	  states	  regularly	  and	  systematically	   flaunt	  even	  the	  most	  basic	  rule	  of	   the	   international	  system,	  namely	  the	   principle	   of	   sovereignty.	   Our	   political	  world	   –	   the	   ‘Westphalian	   system’,	   so	   called	  after	  the	  peace	  treaties	  ending	  the	  Thirty	  Years	  War	  in	  1645	  –	  is	  supposedly	  based	  on	  the	   sovereignty	   of	   the	   territorial	   state.	   Sovereignty,	  meaning	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   single	  and	  absolute	  authority	  within	  the	  state	  and	  none	  beyond	  it,	  facilitates	  the	  delineation	  of	  an	  ‘inside’	  –	  domestic	  politics	  based	  on	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  hierarchical	  state	  structure	  –	  and	   the	   ‘outside’	   –	   international	   relations	   which	   are	   potentially	   anarchical	   in	   the	  absence	   of	   any	   global	   sovereign	   (Palmer	   &	   Colton	   &	   Kramer,	   2007,	   p.140-­‐141).	   This	  inside/outside	  divide	  created	  by	  the	  principle	  of	  sovereignty	  is	  the	  foundation	  not	  only	  of	   the	   modern	   state	   system,	   but	   also	   the	   basis	   for	   political	   community,	   facilitating	  developments	  such	  as	  nationalism,	  democracy	  and	  the	  welfare	  state.	  	  In	   challenging	   this	   very	   basic	   building	   block	   of	   modern	   politics,	   Krasner	   not	   only	  provided	  many	  examples	  in	  which	  states	  showed	  themselves	  not	  to	  be	  sovereign	  –	  not	  being	   in	   control	   of	   their	   territory	   –	   but	   went	   further	   by	   identifying	   a	   pattern	   of	  interaction	  among	  states	  that	  actually	  went	  against	  the	  very	  principle	  upon	  which	  their	  existence	   supposedly	   rests.	   As	  Krasner	   observed,	   ‘every	  major	   peace	   settlement	   from	  Westphalia	  	  to	  	  Dayton	  	  has	  	  involved	  	  violations	  	  of	  	  the	  	  Westphalian	  	  sovereign	  	  state	  model’	   (Krasner,	   2001,	   p.41).	   Crucially,	   the	   organised	   hypocrisy	   around	   sovereignty	  involves	   both	   conflictual	   and	   cooperative	   relations.	   Krasner	   argued	   that	   states	   may	  formally	  accept	  the	  kind	  of	   limitations	  to	  sovereignty	  that	  come	  with,	   for	  example,	  the	  universal	   protection	   of	   human	   rights,	   because	   they	   can	   be	   confident	   that	   in	   practice	  such	   rights	  may	   not	   be	   implemented	   domestically.	   That	   is	   why	   he	   concludes,	   with	   a	  view	   to	   human	   rights	   declarations	  made	   by	   states	   before	   the	  United	  Nations	   General	  Assembly,	  that	  state	  ‘actors	  say	  one	  thing	  and	  do	  another’	  (Krasner,	  2001,	  p.19).	  	  	  
The	  Hidden	  Path	  towards	  European	  Constitutionalization	  Which	   brings	   us	   back	   to	   the	   European	   Union.	   Of	   course	   the	   example	   of	   monetary	  integration	   that	   I	   	   mentioned	   before	   was	   only	   a	   sketch	   of	   the	   much	   more	   complex	  processes	  behind	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  EU.	  And,	  as	  it	  happens,	  I	  am	  not	  really	  an	  expert	  on	  EMU.	  But	   I	   thought	   that	   the	  experience	  of	   the	  euro	   is	  a	  neat	   illustration	  of	   the	  kind	  of	  pattern	  that	  I	  have	  often	  encountered	  in	  my	  own	  work	  on	  European	  institutions.	  Given	  that	  my	  chair	  is	  in	  the	  institutional	  politics	  of	  the	  EU,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  share	  with	  you	  some	  observations	   about	   two	  particular	   aspects	   of	   EU	  politics	   that	   I	   have	  been	  working	  on	  myself:	   first,	   the	   process	   of	   constitutionalizing	   the	   EU	   and,	   second,	   the	   relationship	  between	  member	  states	  and	  the	  European	  Commission.	  Talking	  of	  a	  process	  of	  European	  constitutionalization	  might	  remind	  some	  of	  you	  of	  the	  ill-­‐fated	   attempt	   by	   the	   EU	   leaders	   some	   years	   ago	   to	   give	   the	   Union	   a	   'European	  Constitution'	   (Treaty	   establishing	   a	   Constitution	   for	   Europe,	   2004).	   It	   might	   even	  remind	  a	  few	  of	  the	  locals	  present	  to	  actually	  having	  gone	  and	  voted	  in	  a	  referendum	  -­‐	  a	  privilege	   that	   Germans	   and	   most	   other	   European	   citizens	   did	   not	   have.	   And	  remembering	   the	   'No'	   vote	   delivered	   in	   the	   Netherlands	   and	   in	   France	   -­‐	   a	   vote	   that	  eventually	   killed	   off	   the	   Constitutional	   Treaty	   -­‐	   you	   may	   wonder	   whether	   talk	   of	  'constitutionalization'	  	  has	  any	  value	  today.	  With	  the	  'European	  Constitution'	  dead	  and	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buried,	  together	  with	  the	  lofty	  ambitions	  of	  its	  drafters,	  the	  EU	  has	  returned	  to	  the	  more	  immediate	  task	  of	  'getting	  down	  to	  business'	  (Financial	  Times,	  2005).	  But	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   Union	   has	   retreated	   from	   a	   process	   of	   constitutionalization	   is	  precisely	   the	   mistaken	   view	   -­‐	   dare	   I	   say,	   the	   deception	   -­‐	   that	   I	   think	   constitutes	   an	  example	   of	   'organised	   hypocrisy'.	   Let	   me	   briefly	   summarise	   the	   process	   of	  constitutionalization	  as	  I	  see	  it.	  Firstly,	  the	  Union,	  or	  rather,	  the	  European	  Community,	  was	  established	  in	  the	  1950s	  as	  an	  international	  organisation	  based	  on	  a	  treaty	  among	  states.	   No	   need	   for	   any	   constitution	   at	   that	   point.	   In	   fact,	   the	   integration	   project	  launched	  by	  Robert	  Schuman,	  Konrad	  Adenauer	  and	  Jean	  Monnet	  was	  specifically	  set	  up	  in	  a	   technocratic	  manner	  because	   the	  more	  ambitious	  plans	  by	   federalists	   like	  Altiero	  Spinelli,	  which	  might	  have	  led	  to	  the	  constitution	  for	  a	  European	  Federation,	  had	  failed	  to	  carry	  the	  day	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War	  (Haas,	  1958).	  Instead	  of	  grand	  designs,	  six	  states	  got	  together,	   initially	  merely	  to	  manage	  their	  natural	  resources	  collectively,	  and	  to	   achieve	   in	   the	   process,	   as	   a	   very	   intended	   but	   implicit	   consequence,	   a	   lasting	  reconciliation	   between	   Germany	   and	   its	   neighbours	   (Cini,	   2007,	   p.18-­‐19).	   Thus,	  European	   integration	  appeared	   initially	   a	  project	  of	  purely	  economic	   integration,	  with	  no	  obvious	  need	  for	  anything	  like	  a	  constitution	  (Milward,	  1984).	  	  However,	   over	   the	   past	   six	   decades	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   enterprise	   has	   fundamentally	  changed.	  There	  have	  been	  frequent	  reforms,	  be	  it	  through	  informal	  agreements	  among	  the	  states,	  through	  the	  jurisprudence	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice,	  or,	  more	  recently,	  through	  the	  kind	  of	  treaty	  revision	  that	  was	  agreed	  here	  in	  Maastricht.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  character	  of	   the	  project	  has	  been	   transformed.	  The	  EU	   is	  now	  recognised	  as	   a	  deeply	  political,	  and	  highly	  politicised,	  arena	  in	  which	  decisions	  are	  taken	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  that	  have	   a	   direct	   impact	   on	   the	   lives	   of	   citizens.	   This	   gradual	   and	   long-­‐lasting	   process	   of	  transforming	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   is,	   in	  my	   view,	   best	   characterised	   as	  constitutionalization	  given	  that	  it	  has	  created	  a	  polity	  with	  a	  strong	  foundation	  of	  basic	  rules	  and	  norms	   that	   frame	   the	  way	   in	  which	  decisions	  are	   taken,	  and	   that	   cannot	  be	  easily	  changed	  even	  by	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  actors	  involved	  (see	  also	  Weiler,	  1999).	  	  	  Analysing	  this	  long-­‐term	  process	  of	  gradual	  and	  largely	  hidden	  constitutionalization	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  on	  which	  I	  have	  focused	  in	  my	  research	  over	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  It	  was	  perhaps	  more	  fortune	  than	  foresight	  that	  I	  published,	   in	  1999,	  an	  article	  together	  with	  Knud	  Erik	  Jørgensen	  in	  which	  we	  set	  out	  conceptually	  why	  and	  how	  treaty	  reform	  in	   the	  EU	  needed	   to	  be	   studied	  as	   such	  a	  process	   rather	   than,	   as	  was	   the	  mainstream	  approach	  then,	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	  events	   (Christiansen	  &	   Jørgensen,	  1999).	  Fortunate	  because	   soon	   afterwards,	   in	   May	   2000,	   the	   then	   German	   foreign	   minister	   Joschka	  Fischer	  gave	  his	  famous	  speech	  at	  the	  Humboldt	  University	  in	  Berlin	  outlining	  what	  he	  called	  the	  “strategic	  prospects	  for	  European	  integration	  far	  beyond	  the	  coming	  decade”	  –	  prospects	  which	  led	  him	  to	  push	  for	  –	  and	  I	  quote:	  the	   realisation	   of	   the	   project	   of	   a	   European	   constitution	   centred	   around	   basic,	  human	   and	   civil	   rights,	   an	   equal	   division	   of	   powers	   between	   the	   European	  institutions	  and	  a	  precise	  delineation	  between	  European	  and	  nation-­‐state	   level	  (Fischer,	  2000,	  p.7).	  Fischer’s	   speech	   signalled	   the	   launch	   of	   a	   vibrant	   discourse	   about	   a	   European	  Constitution,	   leading	   to	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   the	   “Convention	   on	   the	   Future	   of	   Europe”	  chaired	  by	  Valery	  Giscard	  d’Estaing,	  to	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Treaty	  in	  2003	  and	  concluding,	  as	  we	  already	  mentioned,	  in	  the	  debacle	  of	  the	  popular	  rejection	  of	  this	  treaty	  in	  several	  member-­‐states	  (Church	  &	  Phinnemore,	  2005).	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In	  other	  words,	  the	  past	  decade	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  one	  long-­‐drawn	  out	  process	  of	  debate,	  negotiation	   and	   ratification	   of	   treaty	   reform	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	   Having	   had	  developed	   previously	   the	   conceptual	   lenses	   required	   to	   study	   such	   a	   process	   –	   for	  example	   to	   identify	   not	   only	   the	   actors	   involved	   but	   also	   the	   political,	   legal	   and	  ideational	   structures	   in	   which	   such	   agency	   takes	   place	   –	   allowed	  me	   to	   ‘connect	   the	  dots’	  and	  develop	  a	  better	  sense	  of	  what	  was	  happening.	  The	  result	  was	  the	  publication	  of	  a	  book,	  together	  with	  Christine	  Reh,	   in	  which	  we	  built	  on	  this	  analytical	   framework	  and	  applied	  it	  both	  to	  the	  long-­‐term	  and	  the	  more	  recent	  developments	  in	  this	  respect	  (Christiansen,	  &	  Reh,	  2009).	  	  Seen	  from	  such	  a	  long-­‐term	  perspective,	  the	  drafting	  of	  the	  'Constitutional	  Treaty'	  was	  not	   the	   huge	   revolution	   as	   which	   it	   was	   presented	   by	   Fischer,	   Giscard	   and	   others	  (Giscard	   d’Estaing,	   2002).	   (Nor	   should	   it	   have,	   in	   my	   view,	   necessitated	   the	  extraordinary	  step	  to	  call	  referenda	  in	  countries	  like	  France	  or	  the	  Netherlands	  that	  do	  not	  have	  a	  domestic	  tradition	  of	  using	  such	  instruments	  of	  participatory	  democracy).	  As	  I	   have	   argued,	   the	   EU	   already	   had	   a	   constitutional	   order,	   albeit	   resting	   on	   a	   partially	  unwritten	   and	   evolving	   set	   of	   basic	   rules	   and	   norms	   (Weiler,	   1996),	   long	   before	   the	  ‘need’	  for	  a	  formal	  European	  Constitution	  was	  elevated	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  Union’s	  agenda.	  What	  politicians	  in	  the	  member	  states	  needed	  to	  do	  –	  and	  where	  they	  ultimately	  failed	  –	  was	  to	  make	  that	  fact	  transparent	  and	  acceptable	  to	  their	  citizens.	  	  	  
The	  Lisbon	  Treaty:	  Constitutionalization	  in	  Disguise	  What	   is	  perhaps	  more	  significant	  still	   in	  the	  context	  of	   this	   lecture	   is	   the	  fact	  that	  this	  process	  continued	  further	  even	  after	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Treaty.	  National	  governments	   took	   some	   time	   out	   –	   a	   “period	   of	   reflection”	   –	   only	   to	   then	   re-­‐package	  most	   of	   the	   ‘European	   Constitution’	   as	   the	   Lisbon	   Treaty,	   which	   was	   signed	   by	   the	  Heads	  of	  State	  and	  Government	  in	  the	  Portuguese	  capital	  in	  December	  2006	  and	  which	  came	  into	  force	  last	  year	  (Dougan,	  2008,	  p.619-­‐620).	  The	  Constitutional	  Treaty	  and	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty:	  two	  documents	  with	  essentially	  the	  same	  content	  (Corthaut,	  2008),	  but	  quite	  the	  reverse	  spin	   in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  politicians	  presented	  this	  to	  their	  domestic	  audiences.	   When	   initially	   we	   were	   told	   that	   a	   ‘European	   Constitution’	   was	   needed	  because	   such	   a	  document	  would	  provide	   the	   legitimacy	   for	   the	   exercise	  of	   the	  power	  that	   had	   accumulated	   in	   Brussels	   over	   the	   previous	   decades,	   a	   few	   years	   later	   the	  message	   was	   that	   these	   same	   changes	   were	   actually	   rather	   marginal	   and	   did	   not	  warrant	  much	  attention.	  Consequently,	  compared	  to	  the	  eight	  national	  referenda	  which	  were	  foreseen	  for	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Treaty,	  only	  one	  was	  held	  on	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty.	  And	  whereas	   the	   ‘no’	  votes	   in	  France	  and	  the	  Netherlands	  had	  blocked	  the	  ratification	  of	  the	  Constitution,	  the	  rejection	  of	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  in	  Ireland	  simply	  forced	   the	  need	   for	   a	   second	   referendum	  at	  which	   the	   Irish	  obliged	   and	  produced	   an	  ultimately	  positive	  result.	  	  Across	  the	  board,	  the	  message	  was	  that	  this	  new	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  did	  not	  really	  warrant	  much	   scrutiny,	   in	   total	   contrast	   to	   the	   revolutionary	   significance	   and	   extraordinary	  attention	   that	   had	   been	   accorded	   to	   the	   European	   Constitution,	   even	   though	   most	  observers	   agree	   that	   there	   is	   little	   material	   difference	   between	   two	   documents.	   The	  point	  here	  is	  not	  whether	  one	  or	  the	  other	  view	  of	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  treaty	  reform	  is	  correct,	  but	  simply	  that	  state	  leaders	  were	  able	  to	  switch	  their	  message	  on	  this	  issue	  around	  by	  180	  degrees	  –	  and	  got	  away	  with	  it.	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Let	  us	  remember	  that	  we	  are	  not	  talking	  about	  some	  minor	  technical	  regulation	  coming	  out	  of	  ‘Brussels’,	  but	  about	  the	  most	  important	  reform	  of	  the	  Union	  since	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty;	   about	   vast	   powers	  which	   are	  being	   accumulated	   at	   the	  European	   level;	   about	  the	   fundamental	  political	  architecture	  of	   this	   continent	   for	   the	  coming	  decades.	   It	   is	  a	  project	   that	   should	   engage	   the	   European	   citizens,	   and	   yet	   the	   overwhelming	   feeling	  coming	  from	  the	  streets	  is	  one	  of	  lethargy	  and	  disenchantment	  with	  the	  EU	  (European	  Commission,	   2009,	   p.21).	   And	   who	   can	   blame	   ‘the	   people’	   for	   not	   understanding,	   or	  indeed	  for	  objecting	  to,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  decisions	  are	  taken	  in	  Brussels,	  when	  national	  politicians	   so	   blatantly	   misrepresent	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   at	   key	   moments	   in	   the	  construction	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  	  What	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  actually	  does	  is	  re-­‐define	  the	  competences	  of	  the	  EU	  institutions	  and	   their	   relations	  with	   each	   other	   as	  well	   as	  with	   the	  member	   states.	   This	   includes	  innovations	  such	  as	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  European	  External	  Action	  Service,	  the	  appointment	  of	  a	  European	  Council	  President,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  possibility	  for	  European-­‐wide	  citizen	  initiatives,	  and	  above	  all	  a	  significant	  expansion	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  (Christiansen	  &	  Reh,	  2009).	  What	  impact	  these	  reforms	  will	  have	  on	  the	  EU’s	  political	  system	  remains	  to	  be	  seen,	  since	  not	  all	  of	  these	  new	  elements	  have	  yet	  been	  implemented	   or	   applied.	   The	   next	   few	   years	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   an	   interesting	   and	  exciting	  period	  for	  European	  integration,	  and	  I	  look	  forward	  to	  making	  my	  contribution	  to	   the	   analysis	   of	   these	   changing	   political	   dynamics	   in	   a	   book	   for	   Oxford	   University	  Press	   that	   will	   be	   co-­‐authored	   with	   Edward	   Best	   and	   Wolfgang	   Wessels	   (Best,	  Christiansen	  &	  Wessels,	  forthcoming).	  	  
The	  European	  Commission:	  Institutional	  Independence	  and	  National	  Interests	  But	  not	  wanting	  to	  speculate	  here	  about	  the	  way	  in	  which	  these	  changes	  will	  pan	  out,	  I	  propose	   to	   shift	   the	   focus	   to	   one	   particular	   aspect	   of	   the	  EU’s	   institutional	   politics	   in	  Brussels	   by	   taking	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   the	   interaction	   between	   member	   states	   and	   the	  European	   Commission.	   I	  would	   argue	   that	   this	   is	   yet	   another	   opportunity	   to	   observe	  how	  the	   ‘official	  version’	  of	  EU	  politics	   is	   frequently	   in	  conflict	  with	   the	  way	   in	  which	  member	  states	  act	  in	  practice.	  I	   should	   preface	   my	   observations	   by	   saying	   that	   the	   very	   notion	   of	   creating	  
supranational	  institutions	  –	  the	  Commission	  as	  the	  European	  executive,	  the	  Parliament	  as	  part	  of	  the	  European	  legislature,	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  as	  the	  European	  judiciary	  –	  means	   that	   these	   should	   be	   above	   the	   states,	   acting	   independently,	   in	   the	   common	  European	   interest	   and	   without	   receiving	   directions	   from	   national	   governments	   (Art.	  245	  TFEU;	  Art.	  253	  TFEU;	  Nugent,	  2006,	  p.155,	  p.293).	  The	  presence	  of	  such	  institutions	  with	  an	  independent	  authority	  is	  one	  of	  the	  hallmarks	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  indeed	  it	  is	  arguably	  the	  defining	  aspect	  of	  European	  integration	  that	  sets	  it	  apart	  from	  the	  kind	  of	   cooperation	   that	   occurs	   in	   other	   global	   regions	   (Best	   &	   Christiansen,	   2008,	   p.578-­‐597).	   Unfortunately,	   the	   ‘independence’	   of	   the	   European	   institutions	   is	   also	   a	   legal	  fiction.	  	  Allow	  me	  to	  introduce	  my	  argument	  with	  a	  brief	  anecdote	  from	  the	  earlier	  stages	  of	  my	  career.	  When	  graduating	  from	  university,	  I	  applied	  –	  like	  a	  few	  million	  others	  before	  and	  after	  me	  –	  for	  an	  internship	  at	  the	  European	  Commission.	  As	  one	  does,	  I	  of	  course	  did	  not	  rely	  on	  the	   inherent	  quality	  of	  my	  CV,	  but	  activated	  a	  contact	   I	  had	   in	  a	  particular	  Directorate.	  This	  Head	  of	  Unit	  told	  me	  that	  he	  would	  do	  what	  he	  could	  to	  try	  and	  get	  me	  on	   the	   shortlist,	   but	   that	   it	  would	   be	   quite	   competitive	   and	   that	   I	   should	   not	   get	  my	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hopes	  up.	  Then	  he	  added:	  “But	  your	  surname	  should	  help.”	  I	  asked	  him	  what	  that	  meant,	  and	  he	  explained	  that	  the	  final	  decision	  on	  the	  selected	  interns	   in	  his	  department	  was	  made	   by	   the	   European	   Commissioner	   himself,	   and	   that	   in	   his	   case	   was	   the	   Danish	  Commissioner.	   In	   approving	   names	   on	   the	   shortlist,	   chances	   were	   that	   a	   Danish-­‐sounding	   name	  would	   not	   be	   crossed	   out.	   How	   fortunate	   for	   a	   North	   German	   to	   slip	  through	  the	  net	  like	  that!	  This	  was	   just	   the	   first	  experience	   in	  many	   that	  showed	  me	  how	  much	  nationality	  and	  national	   interests	   still	  matter	   in	   an	   institution	   that	  was	   supposedly	   above	   all	   that.	   In	  some	  ways	   things	  might	   have	   improved	   –	   the	   Commission	   has	   been	   through	   serious	  crisis	  and	  several	  rounds	  of	  reforms	  since	  then.	  Yet	  the	  fact	  remains	  that	  member	  states	  do	  not	  only	  rely	  on	  the	  formal	  and	  legitimate	  route	  of	  representing	  their	  interests	  in	  the	  Council	   of	   Ministers,	   but	   also	   systematically	   seek	   to	   influence	   the	   work	   of	   the	  Commission	   from	   the	   inside.	   The	   real	   concern	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   of	   course	   not	   about	  lowly	   interns	   (though	   I	   found	   the	   fact	   that	   even	   here	   nationality	   matters	   quite	  extraordinary).	  What	  matters	  politically	  and	  analytically	  are	  the	  dynamics	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  Commission,	  namely	  the	  role	  played	  by	  the	  27	  European	  Commissioners	  –	  one	  from	  each	  member	  state.	  Their	  appointment	  is	  –	  formally	  –	  not	  at	  all	  about	  the	  representation	  of	   ‘their’	   country	   inside	   the	  Commission.	  However,	  national	  governments	  propose	   the	  candidates	   for	   the	   Commission	   and	   appoint	   them	   collectively,	   and	   it	   is	   widely	  acknowledged	   that,	   once	   appointed,	   they	   often	   play	   the	   role	   of	   a	   ‘secondary	  ambassador’	   of	   their	   country	   in	  Brussels	   (Eppink,	  2007,	  p.119).	  When	   speaking	  up	   in	  internal	   meetings	   in	   defence	   of	   their	   member	   state	   interests,	   a	   Commissioner	   will	  camouflage	  his	  or	  her	  comments	  by	  referring	  to	  “the	  country	  I	  know	  best”,	  but	  often	  the	  representation	   of	   member	   state	   interests,	   and	   the	   bargaining	   and	   horse-­‐trading	   that	  comes	  with	  it,	  is	  only	  very	  thinly	  veiled.	  	  The	  significance	   that	  member	  states	  attach	   to	   the	  presence	  of	   ‘their’	  Commissioner	  at	  the	   top	   table	   became	   evident	   during	   the	   recent	   reform	   negotiations.	   In	   the	   wake	   of	  Eastern	  enlargement,	  the	  larger	  member	  states,	  led	  by	  France,	  were	  keen	  to	  reduce	  the	  size	   of	   the	   Commission	   in	   order	   to	   counter	   the	   growing	   number	   of	   small	   state	  representatives	   there	   (Norman,	   2005,	   p.118-­‐121).	   The	   larger	   states	   were	   concerned	  that,	   under	   the	   ‘one	   person/one	   vote’	   decision-­‐making	   system	   operated	   by	   the	  Commission,	   they	  would	   lose	  power,	   given	   that	   they	  had	   already	  previously	   given	  up	  their	  right	  to	  have	  two	  Commissioners	  at	  the	  table.	  Smaller	  states	  fought	  back,	  and	  what	  was	   eventually	   agreed	   was	   a	   reduced	   number	   of	   Commissioners	   and	   a	   system	   of	  rotation	  that	  would	  provide	  equality.	  	  Even	  that	  compromise	  however,	  which	  didn’t	  really	  satisfy	  either	  side	  of	  the	  argument,	  turned	   out	   to	   be	   unacceptable.	   As	  mentioned	   before,	   in	   Ireland	   –	   in	   the	   one	  member	  state	  that	  put	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  to	  a	  vote	  of	  its	  citizens	  –	  the	  initial	  referendum	  ended	  in	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  treaty.	  ‘Losing	  our	  Commissioner’,	  as	  the	  ‘No’	  Campaign	  referred	  to	  it,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  key	  points	  that	  people	  objected	  to	  (Laffan,	  n.d.,	  p.3-­‐4),	  and	  the	  positive	  result	   in	   a	   second	   referendum	   was	   only	   secured	   after	   a	   deal	   was	   struck	   among	   the	  member	  states	  not	  to	  reduce	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Commission.	  In	  the	  end,	  all	  states	  were	  able	  to	  keep	  ‘their’	  Commissioner,	  and	  business	  as	  usual	  is	  bound	  to	  continue.	  	  One	  might	  be	  forgiven	  for	  thinking	  I	  am	  talking	  about	  the	  Council,	  so	  blatant	  has	  been	  the	  bargaining	  over	  the	  relative	  influence	  that	  member	  states	  may	  or	  may	  not	  have	  via	  ‘their’	   Commissioner.	   My	   intention	   here	   is	   not	   to	   incriminate	   any	   individuals.	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	  many	   Commissioners	   have	   demonstrated	   over	   the	   years	   that	   they	   are	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willing	  and	  able	  to	  stand	  up	  to	  the	  pressure	  from	  national	  capitals.	  The	  intervention	  this	  week	   from	  Commissioner	   Reding,	   condemning	   the	   shameful	  mass	   expulsion	   of	   Roma	  from	   France,	   is	   a	   good	   example	   of	   a	   European	   Commission	   not	   afraid	   to	   speak	   up	  against	  powerful	  member	  states	  (European	  Commission,	  2010).	  	  
The	  Changing	  Role	  of	  National	  Governments	  in	  European	  Institutional	  Politics	  My	  point	  remains,	  though,	  that	  there	  has	  been	  a	  pattern	  of	  member	  states	  seeking	  the	  undeniable	   benefits	   of	   an	   integrated	   Europe	   –	   the	   economic	   growth	   that	   comes	   from	  open	  markets,	   the	  security	  and	  stability	   that	  arises	   from	  institutionalised	  cooperation,	  the	   greater	  weight	   in	  world	   politics	   that	   results	   from	   speaking	  with	   one	   voice.	   States	  seek	   these	  benefits	  while	  constantly	   trying	   to	  escape	   the	  political	   ‘cost’	  of	   integration,	  whether	   this	   involves	  accepting	  uncomfortable	   limits	  on	   the	  choices	   they	   face	   in	   their	  domestic	   politics,	   or	   the	   empowerment	   of	   a	   truly	   independent	   authority	   beyond	   the	  state.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   states	   have	   sought	   to	   maintain	   supposedly	  independent	  Commissioners	  as	  representatives	  of	  national	   interests	   in	  Brussels	   is	   just	  the	   tip	   of	   the	   iceberg.	   A	   more	   extended	   discussion	   (if	   we	   had	   the	   time)	   might	   also	  include	  the	  following	  actions	  by	  national	  politicians:	  
- strategically	   ‘parachuting’	   their	   own	   nationals	   into	   senior	   positions	   in	   the	  Commission	  (Christiansen,	  1997,	  p.83)	  
- seeking	   to	   ‘get	   their	   money	   back’	   from	   the	   EU	   budget,	   be	   it	   openly	   a	   la	   Mrs	  Thatcher	   or	   behind	   the	   scenes	   by	   politicising	   individual	   spending	   decisions	  (Laffan,	  1997)	  	  
- delegating	  powers	   to	   implement	  EU	  policies	   to	   the	  European	  Commission,	  only	  to	   then	   interfere	   in	   the	   exercise	   of	   these	   powers	   through	   a	   complex	   web	   of	  comitology	  committees	  (Christiansen	  &	  Larsson,	  2005)	  
- frequently	   failing	   to	   comply	  with	  EU	   legislation,	   even	   after	   being	   sentenced	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  for	  such	  infringements	  (Nicolaides	  &	  Oberg,	  2006)	  
- lobbying	   –	   and	   that	   is	   the	   polite	   term	   –	   ‘their’	   Members	   of	   the	   European	  Parliament	   to	   vote	   along	   national	   rather	   than	   party	   political	   lines	   (Farrell	   &	  Heritier,	  2003,	  p.9)	  ,	  or	  
- regularly	   turning	   European	   elections	   into	   little	   more	   than	   opinion	   polls	   on	  national	  governments	  and	  specific	  domestic	  issues	  (Hix	  &	  Marsh,	  2005,	  p.3).	  The	   list	   goes	   on,	   but	   I	   hope	   my	   point	   about	   the	   organised	   hypocrisy	   that	   EU	   states	  engage	  in	  has	  been	  made.	  I	  realise	  that	  this	  argument	  is	  somewhat	  polemical,	  and	  that	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  would	  deliver	  a	  more	  nuanced	  picture	  of	  what	  goes	  on.	  But	  in	  a	  time	  in	  which	  the	  European	  institutions	  are	  frequently	  criticised	  –	  ironically	  sometimes	  for	  over-­‐reacting	  and	  sometimes	  for	  inaction	  –	  I	  thought	  it	  was	  important	  to	  correct	  this	  image	  by	  pointing	  out	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  it	  is	  often	  not	  the	  EU	  institutions,	  but	  rather	  the	  member	  states,	  that	  are	  failing	  in	  their	  responsibility.	  That	  it	  is	  why	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  reasons	  for	  any	  malaise	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  are	  to	  be	  found	  as	  much	  in	  the	  national	  capitals	  as	  in	  Brussels.	  	  European	   integration	   is,	   after	   all,	   a	   two-­‐level	   game	   (Putnam,	  1988,	  p.433),	  played	  out	  within	   the	  member	   states	   as	  much	   as	   at	   the	   European	   level	   (Graziano	  &	   Vink,	   2007,	  p.15).	   In	   fact,	   integration	  has	  brought	  about	  a	   system	  of	  multilevel	  governance	  with	  a	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multitude	  of	  actors	  on	  several	  territorial	  levels	  (Hooghe,	  Marks	  &	  Blank,	  1998;	  Piattoni,	  2009).	  In	  recognition	  of	  this,	  our	  field	  of	  study	  has	  evolved	  tremendously	  over	  the	  past	  decade,	   to	   provide	   increasingly	   sophisticated	   analyses	   of	   the	   many	   aspects	   of	   this	  emerging	  polity.	  My	   comments	   on	  patterns	  of	   organised	  hypocrisy	  don’t	   do	   justice	   to	  the	  complexity	   in	  both	   the	  real	  world	  and	  the	  academic	  study	  of	  EU	  politics.	  They	  are	  merely	   meant	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   reminder	   that	   we	   should	   not	   overlook	   the	   continuing	  influence	  that	  member	  states	  still	  have	  in	  this	  system,	  and	  the	  many	  different	  forms	  that	  this	  influence	  takes.	  	  But	   I	   should	   take	   care	   not	   to	   come	   across	   as	   being	   too	   negative	   or	   critical.	   I	   am	   not	  saying	  that	  the	  EU	  is	  a	  sham,	  or	  that	  everything	  that	   is	  being	  said	  or	  done	  by	  national	  politicians	  is	  fraudulent.	  On	  balance	  I	  would	  in	  fact	  argue	  that	  things	  are	  improving,	  and	  the	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   reforms	   should	   further	   strengthen	   the	   power	   of	   Commission,	  Parliament	  and	  Court	  to	  act	  independently	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  national	  governments.	  Above	  all	  it	   is	   to	   be	   hoped	   that,	   in	   the	   future,	   we	   will	   see	   a	   more	   direct	   engagement	   between	  citizens	  and	  European	  institutions,	  so	  that	  governments	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  exploit	   the	  lack	  of	  awareness	  about	  European	  affairs	  for	  their	  own	  purposes.	  Once	  the	  people	  see	  through	   the	   often	   hypocritical	   behaviour	   of	   their	   national	   governments,	   it	   will	   be	  difficult	  for	  this	  pattern	  to	  be	  maintained.	  Also	  in	  this	  sense,	  these	  are	  interesting	  times	  to	  study,	  research	  and	  write	  about	  the	  institutional	  politics	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  I	  very	  much	  look	  forward	  to	  doing	  this	  here	  at	  the	  Faculty	  of	  Arts	  and	  Social	  Sciences.	  	  	  
Acknowledgements	  and	  Thanks	  I	  am	  new	  to	  the	  Dutch	  university	  system,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  for	  me	  to	  learn	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  formal	  procedures	  and	  unwritten	  rules.	  But	  thanks	  to	  having	  already	  started	  here	  in	   a	   part-­‐time	   appointment	   a	   couple	   of	   years	   ago,	   the	   learning	   curve	   for	   me	   is	  fortunately	  not	  as	  steep	  as	  it	  would	  otherwise	  be.	  I	  am	  	  of	  course	  not	  new	  to	  Maastricht,	  having	  spent	  the	  past	  seven	  years	  at	  the	  European	  Institute	  of	  Public	  Administration.	  	  Thus	   it	  has	  not	  been	  a	  huge	  move	  geographically,	  but	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  working	  culture	  and	  the	  target	  group	  there	  is	  quite	  a	  difference	  and	  I	  might	  take	  a	  while	  to	  re-­‐adapt	  to	  academia.	   In	   doing	   so,	   I	   am	   lucky	   to	   always	   have	   access	   to	   the	   friendly	   advice	   and	  professional	   counsel	   of	   Tannelie	   Blom,	   Sophie	   Vanhoonacker,	   Christine	   Neuhold,	  Maarten	  Vink	  and	  all	   the	  other	   colleagues	   too	  numerous	   to	  mention	  here.	   I	   am	   really	  extremely	  grateful	   to	  everyone	   for	  having	  made	  me	   feel	  welcome	  here	   from	  the	  start.	  That	  of	  course	  also	  includes	  our	  Dean,	  and	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  you	  personally,	  Rein,	  for	  the	  trust	  you	  have	  placed	  in	  me	  by	  appointing	  me	  to	  this	  position.	  Having	  already	  spoken	  at	  some	  length	  about	  my	  research	  agenda,	  let	  me	  add	  how	  much	  I	  look	  forward	  to	  making	  a	  contribution	  to	  teaching	  at	  FASoS.	  My	  main	  task	  in	  this	  initial	  period	  has	  been	  to	  take	  over	  from	  Tannelie	  as	  Director	  of	  Studies	  for	  our	  new	  Research	  Masters	  in	  European	  Studies.	  The	  RMES	  is	  a	  major	  undertaking,	  and	  it	  has	  been	  a	  great	  achievement	   by	   Tannelie	   and	   the	   whole	   team	   to	   have	   launched	   that	   last	   year.	   I	   am	  aware	  of	  my	   responsibility	   in	   taking	   this	  over	  and	  hope	   I	  will	   be	  able	   to	  build	  on	   the	  early	   success	   that	   this	   new	   programme	   has	   had	   so	   far.	   My	   heartfelt	   thanks	   go	   to	  Elissaveta	  Radulova	  who	  has	  been	  doing	  a	   fantastic	   job	   in	  helping	  me	  to	  negotiate	  the	  complex	   procedures	   we	   have	   in	   place	   to	   organise	   our	   Masters	   teaching.	   I	   am	   also	  pleased	   that	   I	   will	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   keep	   working	   with	   my	   former	   EIPA	  colleagues	   in	   the	  context	  of	   the	  EPA	  masters.	   I	   should	  add	  that	  Simon	  Duke	  and	   I	  will	  probably	  have	  a	  lot	  more	  work	  together	  in	  the	  future,	  given	  the	  success	  of	  the	  Journal	  of	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European	  Integration	  which	  we	  jointly	  edit,	  and	  I	  am	  very	  pleased	  about	  our	  excellent	  cooperation	   and	   our	   achievement	   in	   providing	   a	   home	   for	   the	   journal	   here	   in	  Maastricht.	  I	  look	  forward	  to	  continuing	  that	  regardless	  of	  my	  move	  across	  the	  Vrijthof.	  Here	   at	   the	   faculty,	   I	   am	   glad	   to	   have	   been	   invited	   to	   lead,	   together	   with	   Tannelie,	  Sophie	   and	   Nico	   Randeraad,	   the	   research	   programme	   on	   Administrative	   Governance	  which	  provides	  an	  excellent	   forum	  to	  explore	   issues	  such	  as	   the	  ones	   I	   raised	  here	   in	  greater	  depth	  (Maastricht	  University,	  2010).	  And	  I	  am	  pleased	  that	  in	  working	  with	  Tom	  van	  Veen	  and	  Youngah	  Guahk	  on	  our	  institutional	  relations	  with	  partners	  in	  China	  and	  in	  Korea,	  respectively,	  I	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  contribute	  actively	  to	  our	  efforts	  of	  fully	  internationalising	  the	  educational	  experience	  at	  Maastricht	  University.	  	  Clearly,	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  to	  look	  forward	  to	  in	  taking	  up	  this	  position,	  but	  inevitably	  there	  is	  also	  a	  considerable	  period	  of	  time	  to	  look	  back	  on	  when	  becoming	  a	  professor.	  The	  kind	  of	  academic	  career	  that	  I	  and	  many	  of	  my	  peers	  embarked	  on	  requires	  not	  only	  mental	  flexibility	  and	  life-­‐long	  learning,	  but	  also	  geographical	  mobility.	  A	  day	  like	  today,	  when	  organising	  an	  event	  like	  this,	  is	  a	  timely	  reminder	  that	  geography	  still	  matters	  in	  these	  internet-­‐dominated	   times.	   I	   left	   Hamburg	   during	  my	   studies	   in	   1988,	   initially	   only	   to	  take	  a	  year	  abroad	  at	  the	  London	  School	  of	  Economics.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  departure	  from	  my	  hometown	  was	  permanent	  only	  revealed	  itself	  gradually,	  as	  one	  career	  choice	  led	  to	  another	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  personal	  path-­‐dependency	  that	  is	  not	  unusual	  in	  our	  line	  of	  work.	  It	  has	  been	  exciting	  and	  rewarding	  to	  study	  in	  Hamburg,	  London	  and	  Florence,	  to	  work	  in	  Luxembourg,	  Essex	  and	  Wales,	  and	   to	   teach	   for	  shorter	  periods	   in	  Victoria,	  Bruges,	  Barcelona,	  Moscow,	  Madrid,	  Strasbourg,	  Cologne	  and,	  most	  recently,	   in	  Seoul.	  But	   this	  sort	   of	   life	   does	   take	   a	   toll	   on	   one’s	   private	   life	   and	  makes	   it	   very	   difficult	   to	   stay	   in	  touch	  with	  family	  and	  friends.	  Fortunately	  I	  have	  been	  blessed	  with	  loyal	  friends,	  and	  I	  would	   like	   to	   thank	   in	   particular	   Katrin	   Hilken,	   with	   whom	   I	   went	   to	   high	   school,	  Wolfgang	   Weeren,	   with	   whom	   I	   studied	   economics	   in	   Hamburg,	   Anne	   Karen	  Christensen,	  with	  whom	  I	  worked	  together	   in	  London,	  and	  Thomas	  Widlok,	  who	  lined	  up	  in	  front	  of	  me	  in	  the	  registration	  queue	  at	  the	  LSE	  and	  who,	  after	  many	  travels	  of	  his	  own,	  now	  holds	  a	  chair	  at	  Nijmegen	  University.	  Thank	  you	  not	  just	  for	  joining	  us	  today,	  but	  indeed	  for	  keeping	  in	  touch	  over	  all	  these	  years	  in	  the	  past.	  	  Going	  even	  further	  back	  in	  time,	  this	  is	  of	  course	  a	  moment	  to	  thank	  my	  parents	  for	  their	  unwavering	  support	  from	  day	  one,	  which	  made	  it	  possible	  for	  me	  to	  do	  well	  in	  school,	  to	  attend	  university,	  to	  study	  abroad	  and,	  above	  all,	  to	  think	  freely	  –	  the	  foundation	  of	  any	  academic	  career.	  It	   is	  a	  moment	  I	  would	  have	  liked	  to	  share	  with	  my	  father,	  but	  in	  his	  absence	  I	  am	  all	  the	  more	  grateful	  that	  my	  mother	  and	  brother	  are	  	  here	  with	  me	  today.	  Finally	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  you,	  Youngah,	  for	  your	  love,	  your	  support	  and	  your	  advice	  over	  the	  last	  	  years.	  We	  both	  know	  the	  sacrifices	  that	  you	  have	  made	  in	  moving	  to	  Maastricht,	  the	  difficulties	  you	  have	   faced	  since	   coming	  here,	   and	   the	  hard	  work	  you	  have	  had	   in	  creating	   a	   new	   professional	   life	   for	   yourself.	   And	  we	   both	   know	   that	   I	   would	   not	   be	  speaking	  here	  today	  without	  the	  positive	  influence	  that	  you	  have	  had	  on	  my	  life	  and	  my	  work.	   I	   am	   glad	   that	   taking	   up	   this	   chair	   also	   gives	   us	   both	   the	   chance	   to	   make	  Maastricht	  our	  common	  home.	  To	  be	  honest	  –	  that	  is	  the	  most	  exciting	  prospect	  for	  me	  today.	  	  	  Ik	  heb	  gezegd.	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